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1 Introduction
In francophone West African countries, particularly West African Economic and
Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries,1 macroeconomic stabilization and structural
adjustment policies have been implemented since the end of the 1980s. The
liberalization of financial markets—including the restructuring of the banking sector,
interest rate deregulation, etc.—is an important component of these policies. It is widely
presumed that the liberalization of financial markets may not only lead to a better
allocation of financial resources but also to the elimination of inefficient institutions.
Indeed, in WAEMU countries, the liberalization of financial markets led to the failure
of many commercial banks2 and most development banks3 or agricultural banks.4
Unfortunately, this was not accompanied by the creation of high-performance financial
institutions, particularly in rural and peri-urban areas, that would have taken over after
their failure. In any case, there was a low probability that it could be otherwise, see the
constant decline of the role of the state within the framework of economic reforms.
The commercial banks are established in towns where the country’s wealth is
concentrated. Actually, they are mainly interested in medium and large enterprises or in
rich households. On the other hand, they avoid doing business with the rural and urban
poor, because the costs of supply of microfinancial services are high. In addition, many
credit projects were set up. The results of these projects—often excessively dependent
on subsidies—are disappointing most of the time.5 This led donors to suspend their
support to these projects, thus causing bankruptcy for most of them. In addition, there
are very dynamic and diversified informal financial institutions, which adapt relatively
well to the mainly limited savings and credit needs of poor populations. But, they are
generally ill equipped to finance medium- and long-term investments on a substantial
scale.
The lack of access to formal financial services in rural and peri-urban areas and the
inability of the informal sector to provide sustainable financial services to the poor led
to the emergence of innovative financial institutions. These innovative financial
institutions, usually labelled under the term ‘microfinance institutions’, have emerged
with the support of government, civil institutions, and donor organizations.
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) include member-based savings and credit
cooperatives, solidarity credit groups, small credit projects, and credit NGOs. Contrary
to banks, which serve exclusively urban elites, MFIs focus on rural and urban poor
households and their demand for financial services. Therefore, one understands the
increased interest of public authorities in West African countries—particularly
1 The West African Economic and Monetary Union currently comprises eight countries: Benin, Burkina
Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger and Togo. The common currency of WAEMU
countries, the franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA franc), is issued by a single central
bank, the Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO). $US1 = 700 CFAF.
2 A total of 18 commercial banks went bankrupt.
3 Development banks went bankrupt in all these countries, except in Mali.
4 Agricultural banks have been liquidated in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, and Togo.
5 The lack of efficiency of these projects is mainly caused, among others, by weak repayment rates,
mismanagement, etc.2
WAEMU countries—and various actors (donors, civil organizations, private sector,
etc.) that emerged in the recent years for investing in microfinance.
If top priority was given until the mid-1990s to the increase of the number of MFIs in
order to provide financial services to the poor on a large scale, a twofold widespread
consensus has been reached since the last few years. First, the financial needs of poor
populations are structural needs and institutions that target at the poor have to be viable
and sustainable. Second, MFIs cannot be successful without the appropriate legal and
regulatory framework. In recognition of these premises, in 1994 WAEMU political and
monetary authorities set up a legal and regulatory framework.
On the one hand, it was hoped that the liberalization of financial markets and the
regulatory measures, by eliminating gross distortions and reducing the cost of service
delivery would to lead to viable and sustainable MFIs. Indeed, research and studies on
financial reforms and regulatory policies have been pointing to the substantial positive
effects of such reforms and policies on the microfinance sector in Asia (Gurgand et al.
1996; Larrivière and Martin 1998, etc.) and in Latin America (Gonzalez-Vega et al.
1997; Ramirez 1998, etc.). On the other hand, it was hope that these measures, by
eliminating faulty or fraudulent microbanking practices, would contribute significantly
to institutional sustainability. Some studies (CGAP 1996; Zeller and Sharma 1998;
European Commission 1998, etc.) have shown that the liberalization of the financial
market as well as the creation of an appropriate legal and regulatory framework led to a
healthy microfinancial sector.
However, one can note that in WAEMU countries, the number of MFIs has been
growing since the implementation of financial reforms and the creation of the legal and
regulatory framework. But it is doubtful whether this implies that they are performing
well. For example, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) estimates that
only about 3-5 per cent of MFIs worldwide are at present financially sustainable.
Another 7-10 per cent are expected to become financially sustainable within ten years.
The other 90 per cent of MFIs will either fold or continue requiring subsidies (Gurgand
et al. 1996).
Furthermore, it can be pointed out that since then no evaluation has been undertaken
about the performance of MFIs in WAEMU countries. According to various opinions
expressed within WAEMU financial and monetary policy and research circles, the
liberalization of financial markets and the creation of the regulatory framework have
had or should have significant impact on the performance of the microfinancial sector.
To address the above hypotheses and examine the empirical foundations of the above
doubts, this study addresses the following questions. Does the fast development of the
microfinancial sector in WAEMU countries show that MFIs are performing well? In
other words, do MFIs play a significant and increasing role in financial intermediation?
Do they succeed in providing the target populations with sustainable financial services
on a large scale? To answer these questions, the study confronts data from Burkina
Faso, a country whose geographical situation encompasses both the advantages of
WAEMU coastal countries and the disadvantages of WAEMU arid countries.
The study includes five sections. Section 1 presents the discussions concerning the
evaluation of the performance of MFIs, followed by a description of the methodological
approach in section 2. Section 3 and section 4 highlight major findings with regard to3
outreach performance and sustainability, respectively. Section 5 provides a summary of
conclusions and recommendations that emerged from the study.
2 ‘Welfare studies’ versus ‘institutional studies’
In developing countries, the lack of access to savings, credit and insurance services is
among the main constraints facing low-income households and the poorest. This lack of
financial services contributes to limiting the ability of the poor to finance their activities,
improve their incomes, and have access to basic services such as food, education,
medical services, clothing, housing, etc. (Zeller and Sharma 1998). Because commercial
banks neglect to provide savings and credit services to them, the poor, at least until the
1950’s, almost exclusively borrowed from informal lenders (Adams and Vogel 1986;
Germidis et al. 1991; Adams and Delbert 1994, etc.).
In order to mitigate the imperfections of financial markets, microcredit projects were
established after the Second World War, thanks to support from governments and
donors. The objective was both to reach the greatest number of poor people and to
provide them with financial services at a low cost. Since it was widely believed that the
key determinant of the poor demand for credit was its costs, these microcredit
programmes were largely subsidized. Governments and donors then designed
microcredit as part of an integrated programme of poverty alleviation and welfare
improvement in favour populations. Their approach was considered to be ‘welfarist
approach’ or ‘directed credit approach’. Based on logic of subsidization, this approach
led to high unpaid rates and transaction costs, resulting in the failure of many
microcredit programmes (Von Pischke et al. 1983; World Bank 1989; Yaron 1994,
etc.).
Economists from Ohio State University—such as Adams, Cuevas, Graham, Von
Pischke, Adams and Donald, etc., experts in rural finance—were among the first to
show that most of these credit programmes launched in developing countries have
failed. They blame this failure on the fact that these programmes are based on faulty
conceptions: (i) the poor are neither creditworthy nor able to save; (ii) credit should be
cheap in order to allow small farms and urban microactivities to be profitable enough;
(iii) subsidized microcredit may decrease the role of informal lenders which charge high
interest rates; (iv) financial transactions on informal financial markets would not be
significant, and (v) commercial banks would not operate in rural areas because
transaction costs are higher.
According to rural finance experts, each of these assumptions led to ‘worst practices’
which resulted in inefficient and costly policies: (i) low interest rates had often led to
gross distortions and mistargeting in services; (ii) subsidized credit constantly
encouraged borrowers to engage in less productive activities, and contributed to
significantly increased loan losses; (iii) cheap formal credit benefited only rich
households, i.e. a tiny proportion of the population; (iv) finally, low interest rates
prevented full recovery of transaction costs, and severely affected the performance of
financial institutions.
These findings led to a new approach characterized by the will to liberalize financial
markets. This new approach strongly influenced financial reforms implemented in4
developing countries. Considered as an ‘institutionalist approach’ or ‘financial market
approach’, it, above all, focuses on the fact that subsidies led to a worse allocation of
financial resources, and to unsustainable institutions. The defenders of this approach
(Adams 1985, 1992; World Bank 1989; Gurgand et al. 1994, etc.) are seeking to
establish first of all institutions, which offer savings and credit services on sustainable
and commercial bases. MFIs designed in this way emphasize financial self-reliance and
viability. They charge high interest rates, because of high lending costs. The objective is
not only to reach large numbers of the poor, but also to do it in a sustainable manner
(Gurgand et al. 1996; Yaron and Charitonenko 1998; Gibbons and Meehan 1999, etc.).
These two approaches, i.e. the ‘welfarist approach’ and the ‘institutional approach’ still
exist. Many MFIs are caught, on the one hand, by their determination to find new
sources of external funding to increase their loan portfolio in order ensure their financial
viability, and, on the other hand, by their concern to provide service to low-income and
poor people, and reconcile their economic and social objectives. This contrasted
opposition between two the trends of thought constitutes what is commonly known as
‘microfinance schism’.
This schism is also characterized by the methods to evaluate the performance of MFIs.
The ‘welfarists’ measure the performance of MFIs on the basis of ‘welfare studies’ or
‘household studies’. They are interested in MFIs’ impact on the living conditions of the
beneficiaries. Welfare studies are strongly criticized by the ‘institutionalists’ because of
their subjectivity, their cost and the methodological difficulties they introduce. They
would rather deal with ‘institutionalist studies’. They are interested in market variables,
such as the repayment rate, transaction costs, the degree of financial self-reliance, etc.
The welfarists, in turn, object to the institutionalists because of their failure to take into
account the outreach performance as well as MFIs effects on the poor. Therefore, they
propose other performance criteria: the number of savings accounts or the number of
loans, the improvements in productivity, incomes, capital accumulation, food
expenditures, and social services (education, health, housing, etc.).
Today, there is neither an agreed upon nor a widespread definition of a well-performing
MFI. The performance criteria and indicators used vary significantly from one author to
the next, or from one organization to another, since they depend on the methodological
approach, which, in turn, depends on the determination to give priority to the supply
side or to the demand side of the financial intermediation.6
3 Analytical framework
Since no definition of a well-performing MFI has been able to rally support
unanimously, we adopt an approach based on both performance criteria introduced by
Yaron (1992b, 1997) and those proposed by CGAP (1996). These authors suggest two
key criteria to evaluate the performance of MFIs: outreach and sustainability. It is
6 Many authors and organizations have published evaluation methods. For example, PEARLS by the
World Council of Credit Unions, the ‘Micro-Rate’ by the Private Sector Initiative Corporation and by
UNCTAD, CAMELS developed by ACCION International, performance criteria designed by the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)/World Bank, USAID’s Microenterprise Innovation
Project, etc.5
important to mention that a great majority of studies are based on these criteria
(Gurgand et al. 1996; Larrivière and Martin 1998; Gibbons and Meehan 1999).
Outreach is defined as the ability of a MFI to provide high quality financial services to a
large number of clients. The indicators of outreach performance are changes in the
number of clients, percentage of female clients, the amount of savings deposits, the
value of the outstanding loan portfolio, the average amount of savings deposits, the
average value of loans, etc.7
Sustainability requires MFIs to cover all transaction costs (loan losses, financial costs,
administrative costs, etc.) with the return on equity (net of any subsidy received), and
consequently to function without subsidies. It is measured by indicators such as the
sustainable interest rate,8 the quality of loan portfolio, administrative efficiency, staff
productivity, and the degree of dependence to subsidies.
In this study, MFIs sustainable interest rate is estimated on basis the model suggested by
CGAP (1996).9
[] II LL K CF LL AE R - - + + + = ) 1 ( ) (
R = the annualized effective (or viable) interest rate
AE = administrative costs
LL = loan losses
CF = financial costs
K = the desired capitalization rate
II = investment income.
Dependence to subsidies is measured by the subsidy dependence index (SDI) developed
by Yaron (1992b, 1997). The SDI is defined by Yaron (1997) as the ratio which
measures the percentage increase in the average on-lending interest rate required to
compensate an MFI for the elimination of subsidies in a given year while keeping the
return on equity equal to the approximate nonconcessional borrowing cost. SDI is
calculated on basis the following formula:
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S = total subsidy
A = subsidy on concessional rate borrowing
7 Other indicators such as changes in the number of branches or units established, the number of
savings accounts, the number of loans, the value of assets, etc. are also used.
8 The viable interest rate that an MFI will need to realize on its loans.
9 Each variable in this equation is divided by the average outstanding loans, and is therefore expressed
as a decimal fraction. For further details, see CGAP (1996).6
m = market (reference) interest rate
c = concessional interest rate
E = annual average equity
P = profit (losses)
K = miscellaneous grants and benefits
LP = annual average loan portfolio
i = lending interest rate.
This analytical framework is confronted with data from a random sample of six
Burkinabe MFIs10 (two member-managed savings and credit cooperatives,11 two group
credit institutions,12 and two credit project and NGOs)13 considered as representative of
the microfinancial (the different philosophies, approaches and institutional models,
localization of institutions, etc.). The sample includes the Federation des Caisses
Populaires (FCPB), the Union des Coopératives d'Epargne et de Crédit du Bam (URC-
Bam), Promotion du Développement Industriel et Agricole (PRODIA), the Fonds
d'Appui aux Activités des Femmes (FAARF), the Association pour le Développement
de la Région de Kaya (ADRK) and the Association ‘Etre comme les Autres’ (ECLA). A
brief overview of the main characteristics of these institutions is presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Characteristics of selected microfinance institutions
Savings and credit
cooperatives Group credit institutions Projects and NGOs
FCPB CEC/Z PRODIA FARRF ADRK ECLA
Date of creation 1972 1989 1981 1991 1969 1991
Geographical coverage (%) 69 02 04 82 07 04
No of branches 102 09 02 45 290 03
Target population Rural urban Rural Peri-urban Women Rural Rural
% women 24 49 58 100 31 35
Average savings (US$) 72 70 – – 22 16
Average credit (US$) 547 548 485 614 75 224
Source: BCEAO/BIT (2001).
10 The microfinancial sector comprises between 50 and 60 institutions.
11 Savings and credit cooperatives operate on the cooperative principles. They offer both mandatory
savings deposits and credit services. Cooperatives also give ownership and control to members.
12 Group credit institutions focus on women. Most institutions provide credit facilities only. They grant
loans, thanks to donor funds.
13 The third group of MFIs comprises credit projects and NGOs.7
4 Outreach performance
Outreach performance requires microfinance institutions to reach a large public, and to
have a significant and increasing volume of activities (savings, credit, insurance, etc.).
4.1 Clientele
MFIs clientele is very heterogeneous, since they target both rural households and urban
low-income populations. Urban clients are mainly small traders, micro-entrepreneurs,
groups, and associations. Rural clients are small farmers, animal breeders, women,
craftspeople, groups, and associations. According to PNUD (2000), poverty in Burkina
Faso hits mainly these categories of the population. This makes it possible to assert that
MFIs reach the poor populations, and even the poorest.
Women14 are under-represented in MFIs clientele (see Table 1). They are relatively less
represented in the savings and cooperative systems and in the credit projects/NGOs than
in the group credit systems. This result can be easily explained. While savings and
credit cooperatives, and credit projects or NGOs target all categories of poor people,
solidarity credit systems serve almost exclusively women.
As Table 2 shows, MFIs have been characterized by significant growth in the number of
their clientele (an average annual growth rate of about 24 per cent). This finding,
however, reveals an uneven progress. For example, the number of female clients
increased less rapidly (average annual growth rate of about 9 per cent). The number of
members of savings and credit cooperatives grew at an average annual growth rate of
nearly 20 per cent, against 14 per cent for the clientele of group credit institutions and 7
per cent for the number of clients of other institutions (projects and NGOs). In 2000, the
total number of MFIs clients stood at 497,000, representing 8.3 per cent of the target
populations.15 Despite the rapid growth of MFIs clientele, their outreach remains small
compared with the potential demand.
Table 2




institutions Projects and NGOs
FCPB CEC/Z PRODIA FARRF ADRK ECLA
Total
MFIs
1994 68,175 318 537 36,115 8,579 2,500 110,350
1995 82,769 2,862 730 55,256 8,033 2,216 155,951
1996 92,702 7,155 947 69,070 9,965 2,800 170,180
1997 120,000 12,972 1,207 74,706 12,428 2,935 257,944
1998 162,789 15,438 1,028 78,442 13,049 2,955 344,557
1999 196,892 18,801 994 84,717 14,466 2,750 468,446
2000 238,067 22,516 1,092 94,494 15,479 3,328 497,446
Source: BCEAO/BIT (1996, 1998, 2001).
14 According to UNDP (1999) women are among the poorest.
15 The number of the target poor clients in Burkina Faso is estimated at around 6 million (BCEAO/BIT
2001).8
The largest institution, caisses populaires, accounted for around 48 per cent of all
clients. Other small MFIs each served around 2,300 clients (0.01 per cent of all clients).
In some areas, there is no intense competition amongst MFIs. However, it is worth
revisiting these figures. Most MFIs are still relatively young—the average age nearly 9
years—and in full expansion. It is true that most MFIs cover a small fraction of all
target clientele. But if one considers some small areas, one notices that their outreach
performance is much more significant. Indeed, there are pockets of the country, where
coverage is very high. It may range from 30 per cent in some villages of member-
managed village banks to an average of 40 per cent for caisses populaires, and even 60
per cent for some projects and NGOs.
4.2 Financial services provided by MFIs
MFIs offer a very limited range of savings and credit products. Savings products
comprise short-term savings (the small amounts the population saves for emergencies
and unexpected expenditures) and long-term savings (money the population saves for
specific expenses, particularly medium or long-term investments). The average duration
of short-term savings is one month. Most MFIs do not pay interest on short-term
savings. For long-term savings, the interest rates range between 3 per cent and 5 per
cent per year.
MFIs offer mainly two types of microcredit products: short-term individual or group
credit, and medium and long-term individual credit. The first type of loan is
characterized by (i) the average loan size being between CFAF 5,000 (US$ 7.14) and
CFAF 300,000 (US$ 428.57); (ii) terms are from six to twelve months; (iii) the interest
rates range between 10 per cent and 17 per cent per year in nominal terms). For medium
and long-term credit (terms exceed 12 months), borrowers are primarily individual
micro-entrepreneurs. The average loan size ranges between CFAF 300,000
(US$ 428.57) and CFAF 3 million (US$ 4,285.71). Here also, interest rates, average
loan terms as well as loan guarantee systems vary from one MFI to another. In general,
savings and credit cooperatives use traditional loan guarantee schemes (physical assets,
prize durable goods, etc.), whereas group credit institutions lay emphasis on group-
based liability. As far as projects and NGOs are concerned, they have been divided
between the two systems.
Table 3




institutions Projects and NGOs
FCPB CEC/Z PRODIA FARRF ADRK ECLA
% short-term savings 80 85 – 100 82 85
Savings interest rate 0-4% 3-5% – 0% 5% 0%
% short-term loans 90 69 73 100 40 82
Lending interest rate 10% 11-17% 17% 10% 10-12% 15%
Average loan duration (month) 12 6 to 12 12 6 to 12 12 6 to 12
Source: BCEAO/BIT (2001).9
Savings and credit cooperatives, projects, and NGOs grant loans for productive as well
as consumption purposes. Group credit institutions finance exclusively productive and
commercial activities. However, on average, more than 70 per cent of loans are given
for less than one year which cannot allow the borrowers to use them for long-term
investments. Savings deposits are mainly short-term savings (Table 2) that cannot be
used to support long-term lending.
4.2.1Savings and credit
MFIs savings activity is strongly influenced by their philosophical approach and
particularly by the choice to focus on the mobilization of local savings or on lending
activity. The rapid growth in the number of MFIs clients has led to high levels of
savings deposits (Table 4). In effect, deposits significantly increased throughout the
years, rising to CFAF 14.9 billion (US$ 21.28 million) in 2000, compared CFAF 3.8
billion (US$ 5.43 million) in 1994 (average annual growth rate of 23.7 per cent in
nominal terms). The growth of savings deposits was particularly the work of savings
and credit cooperatives (average annual growth of 27 per cent). Cooperatives accounted
for almost 89 per cent of total amount of savings deposits in 2000. Cooperatives, it must
be remembered, give priority to savings in comparison with credit. The increase in
savings was very low for group credit systems (average annual growth rate of less than
10 per cent). Group credit institutions as well as projects and NGOs have concentrated
mostly on providing credit facilities.
Similarly, FMIs loan portfolio grew significantly (see Table 5). By the end of December
2000, MFIs had granted loans for a total amount of CFAF 17.6 billion (US$ 25.18
million). The average nominal growth rate was 35.3 per cent per year. Group credit
institutions hold the highest record of growth, with a nominal growth of 50 per cent per
year, followed by savings and credit cooperatives (average nominal growth of 36 per
cent per year), and projects and NGOs (average nominal growth of 20 per cent per
year).
Table 4




institutions Projects and NGOs
FCPB CEC/Z PRODIA FARRF ADRK ADRK
Total
MFIs
1994 2,564 75 – 51 74 12 3,358
1995 3,861 143 – 47 89 25 5,072
1996 4,687 238 – 58 134 25 6,106
1997 6,529 374 – 343 175 28 8,434
1998 8,394 449 – 412 210 31 11,370
1999 9,889 308 – 421 213 32 12,850
2000 11,259 370 – 434 287 35 14,900
Source: BCEAO/BIT (1996, 1998, 2001).10
Table 5




institutions Projects and NGOs
FCPB CEC/Z PRODIA FARRF ADRK ADRK
Total MFIs
1994 961 212 112 33 228 6 2,122
1995 2,048 398 204 296 312 10 3,988
1996 3,959 496 317 719 487 6 6,085
1997 4,862 712 354 1,103 488 15 9,732
1998 6,063 883 361 1,247 498 36 11,229
1999 8,099 546 420 1,624 611 82 15,091
2000 10,228 573 504 1,721 641 172 17,625
Source: BCEAO/BIT (1996, 1998, 2001).
One important observation that can be made from Tables 4 and 5 is that the largest MFI,
caisses populaires (FCPB), represents 75 per cent of the total amount of savings
mobilized by MFIs and 58 per cent of the total amount of loans granted by all the MFIs.
Besides, MFIs represent 4 per cent of the total amount of local savings mobilized by all
the financial institutions (MFIs, commercial banks, and other formal institutions) and 2
per cent of the total value of loans granted by all the financial institutions.
5 Sustainability
The sustainability of MFIs depends, among others, on elements such as the structure of
interest rates, quality of loan portfolio, staff productivity, financial and administrative
costs. We analyse these different elements and the resulting degree of financial and
operational self-sustainability.
5.1 Interest rates
The viability of MFIs, and consequently their sustainability, is closely linked to their
financial spread. MFIs lending interest rates (12 per cent to 24 per cent per year) are
obviously higher than the formal market rate (14 per cent), except for some rare
institutions, such as caisses populaires or FAARF. In effect, most MFIs mainly operate
in rural and peri-urban areas, often in remote areas, where risks and transaction costs are
very high.
Table 5 indicates that MFIs interest rates on loans, although usually higher than bank
rates, are not viable. Most MFIs should double, even triple their lending interest rate to
cover all the costs. The difference between sustainable lending interest rate and the
present lending interest rate is particularly high as far as PRODIA and ECLA are
concerned. It must be said that these two institutions do not offer savings services.
Are low-income people and the poorest able to pay for financial services at high interest
rates (25 per cent to 44 per cent per year)? From this viewpoint, it can be noticed that a
great number of empirical studies have shown that what is most valuable to the poor is11
the access to financial services. They are often willing to pay for services at full costs.
Besides, one knows that in Burkina Faso, the poor borrow from informal lenders despite
their high interest rates. Lending interest rates on the informal financial market can
reach 50 per cent, or even more, for a few of months (Tapsoba 1982; Ellsasser 1992;








FCPB CEC/Z PRODIA FAARF ADRK ECLA
Lending interest rate 10 15 17 10 12 15
Sustainable interest rate 11.85 31.25 42.34 25.12 23.76 44.19
5.2 Quality of loan portfolio
In order to supply their services on a sustainable basis, it is imperative that MFIs
maintain high repayment rates. Failing to maintain the quality of their loan portfolio can
affect their efficiency.
Table 6 shows that all the MFIs studied have quite high repayment rates. Usually, they
add up to more than 91 per cent, even 99 per cent to 100 per cent for some. For group
credit institutions such as PRODIA and FAARF, these high repayment rates appear to
be closely linked to group loans and to the use of group-based liability.16 These
mechanisms are particularly adapted to small borrowers, especially women who
generally lack traditional collateral-suitable assets.
Table 7




institutions Projects and NGOs
FCPB CEC/Z PRODIA FAARF ADRK ECLA
1994 93 96 97 98 95 100
1995 98 97 95 97 99 100
1996 99 97 95 93 91 100
1997 97 96 96 95 97 100
1998 94 91 94 94 96 99
1999 99 90 92 95 97 100
2000 98 95 94 96 96 100
Source: BCEAO/BIT (1996, 1998, 2001).
16 Through the mechanism of solidarity guarantee (or ‘peer monitoring’), in case of failure to repay,
every member of the group is responsible for the debt contracted by one of them. With this
mechanism, pressure within the group can be high and constitutes an efficient means of encouraging
the repayment of loans (Hoff and Stiglitz 1993).12
Savings and credit cooperatives (FCPB and CEC/Z) as well as projects and NGOs
(ADRK and ECLA) also experience very high repayment rates. Repayment rates are
higher in savings and credit cooperatives because a strong sense of ownership is
maintained. The performance of projects and NGOs is due to the fact that they intervene
on a small scale and they can, in this way, follow-up and monitor borrowers who might
encounter difficulties in repaying their loans.
5.3 Administrative expenses
The sustainability of MFIs also depends on their capacity to minimize transactions
costs, especially administrative expenses. According to Christen (1997), the norms of
‘optimal practices’ assume that well-managed MFIs should be able to maintain the ratio
of administrative expenses to transaction costs between 15 per cent and 25 per cent.
Table 8 indicates that none of the case studies is administratively efficient. According to
BCEAO/BIT (2001), the average administrative expenses of the cooperative systems,
solidarity credit systems and projects in 2000 were respectively 33.1 per cent, 48.4 per
cent and 39.4 per cent, respectively. Savings and credit cooperatives are more efficient
than the other microfinancial systems. One may assume that this difference comes from
the fact cooperatives massively use voluntary staffs (cashiers, elected leaders, etc.).
In addition, it can be noticed that the ratio of personnel expenses rather developed in a
jigsaw fashion. The creation of new branches usually leads to a high increase of
administrative costs. However, let us note that the rate of administrative costs for
FAARF, 61 per cent, is very high. FAARF justifies this high rate through its large
geographical coverage, which requires initial important investments in infrastructure
and human resources.
Table 8




institutions Projects and NGOs
FCPB CEC/Z PRODIA FAARF ADRK ECLA
1994 51 35 56 40 43 45
1995 30 34 47 43 40 42
1996 26 37 41 49 39 41
1997 28 33 43 58 34 48
1998 32 26 51 63 36 45
1999 38 29 52 61 36 48
2000 41 20 48 61 32 47
Source: BCEAO/BIT (1996, 1998, 2001).
5.4 Staff efficiency
The most important part of administrative costs is attributed to personnel expenditures.
They range between 50 per cent and 70 per cent of the total amount of MFI
administrative expenses (Gibbons and Meehan 1999). Therefore, it is essential that13
MFIs control their staff efficiency. Staff efficiency17 is measured through ratios such as
the average number of savings accounts or the average amount of savings deposits per
employee, the average number of loans per employee or the average value of loan
portfolio per employee. Since some MFIs in our sample do not offer savings services,
we use the last two ratios.
As far as the average number of loans per employee is concerned, the optimum for
MFIs is between 300 and 500 clients (Christen 1997; Gibbons and Meehan 1999). On
the other hand, there is no optimal range for the average amount of the loan portfolio
per employee, since it depends on the loan methodology used, the level of the clientele’s
poverty, the economic environment, etc.
Table 9 shows that staff productivity is low. For example, if one considers the average
number of loans per employee in 2000, one clearly sees that only one MFI, ADRK, has
a ratio that is higher than 300 (i.e., 669 clients). It also has the highest average amount
of portfolio per employee. The other MFIs are far from the norm of 300 clients per
employee.
Among the main explanations for this low productivity of MFI staff, one can mention










FCPB CEC/Z PRODIA FAARF ADRK ECLA
No of loans per employee 86 110 68 51 669 25
Value of loan/employee 17,000 42,000 23,300 21,600 87,200 3,900
Source: BCEAO/BIT (1996, 1998, 2001).
5.5 Dependence on subsidies
The analysis of the subsidy dependence index for all of the six selected institutions
shows a high dependence of MFIs, even the older ones,18 on subsidies (see Table 10).
In 2000, the two savings and credit cooperatives, (i.e., FCPB and CEC/Z) had to raise
their lending interest rate by 29 per cent and 136 per cent, respectively, in order to
ensure their self-sustainability. To compensate for full elimination of subsidies, the two
group credit institutions, PRODIA and FAARF, had to more than double their interest
rate on loans. Finally, the SDI of ADRK and ECLA shows that they had to increase
respectively their lending interest rate by 185 per cent and 236 per cent to be self-
sustainable.
17 This concerns the ‘productive’ staff, i.e. field staff (credit officials, cashiers, etc.).
18 FCPB and ADRK have more 25 years of experience.14
These results are consistent with the finding from the analysis of MFIs sustainable
interest rates (see section 4.1). It is necessary to raise the lending interest rate in hopes
of covering all transaction costs, and even more, to suppress the subsidies.
However, it is important to point out that in the year 2000 the two oldest MFIs, i.e.
FCPB and ADRK, had the lowest SDI. Conversely, the youngest MFIs, i.e. FAARF and
ECLA, had the highest SDI. From the results, it is evident that there is a correlation
between SDI and the age of the institution. It supports the theory that MFIs must be
allowed time to become self-sustainable. On the other hand, it appears that savings and
credit cooperatives, i.e. FCPB and CEC/Z, which offer obligatory savings have the
lowest SDI. This suggests that the mobilization of local savings may help MFIs to
ensure their viability and sustainability.
Table 10







FCPB CEC/Z PRODIA FAARF ADRK ECLA
1 Market interest rate = m (%) 14 14 14 14 14 14
2 Subsidies on concessional borrowing 00 00 17 313 52 33
3 Annual average equity = E (millions CFAF) 1801 487 495 1328 263 45
4 Subsidy on equity = E*m (millions CFAF) 252 68 69 186 37 06
5 Miscellaneous grants (millions CFAF) 375 33 73 99 30 14
6 Profit (losses) = P (millions CFAF) 496 -05 09 323 71 01
7 Total subsidy = (2)+(4)+(5)–(6) 131 106 150 275 48 52
8 Interest income = LP*i (millions CFAF) 457 78 72 126 56 22
9 Subsidy dependence index = (7)/(8) 29% 136% 208% 218% 86% 236%
6 Conclusions, recommendations, and research questions
Among the key findings that emerge from the study, we can point out the following:
- Reaching the poor on a large scale remains a challenge for FMIs: Despite the rapid
growth of MFIs in recent years, their outreach remains very small compared to the
potential demand. About 92 per cent of the 6.5 million of poor households in Burkina
Faso have not been reached. One also notes that, with few exceptions (savings and
credit cooperatives and some NGOs), MFIs have focused mainly on providing
short-term credit services. In addition, MFIs do not offer other financial services such
as micro-insurance and money transfers.
- Savings mobilization leads to better self-sustainability: savings and credit
cooperatives succeeded in mobilizing an important volume of savings deposits. They
have the lowest subsidy dependence index because the mobilization of savings
provides them with inexpensive and sustainable source of funds for lending. The
other microfinance systems, and particularly group credit institutions which do not
provide deposit services, have the highest subsidy dependence rates. Savings
mobilization, therefore, is an indispensable element for a well-performing MFI.15
- MFIs have a high quality loan portfolio: All the microfinance institutions have high
repayment rates. This constitutes proof that the low-income populations and the
poorest are a good credit risk when loan guarantee schemes are well adapted.
- MFIs are not self-sustainable: All the MFIs in Burkina Faso, including the largest
and the oldest institutions, depend on subsidies. MFIs interest rates are kept low and
do not allow them to cover all the transactions costs (administrative cost, financial
cots, loan losses, etc.). They are administratively inefficient. As the subsidy
dependence index indicates, MFIs, even the oldest, rely from subsidies from donor
organizations. This result indicates that building a sustainable MFI requires a long-
term effort, some patience, and outside support. Outside support is particularly
needed for institution building (training, information and sensitizing, etc.) as well as
for the creation of new branches or the development of innovative products.
In view of these findings, the approach to improve the performance of MFIs calls for:
- More attention should be placed on savings mobilization: The potential demand for
microfinance is large. Demand concerns credit facilities, savings services, insurance
services, etc. To reach a large number of the poor, MFIs need to concentrate on
providing all these financial services. Savings mobilization particularly must receive
an adequate attention because it provides MFIs with a sustainable source of funds for
lending. In addition, MFIs should establish strong partnerships with commercial
banks in order to attract additional financial resources for lending. They should also
negotiate funds for long-term lending with local and external partners.
- MFIs should adopt efficient management information systems: MFIs, even the
smallest, have reached a level of operation that requires adequate management
information systems (MIS). Using efficient management information software as
well as other innovative banking technologies (credit scoring technology, smart card
operations, Internet, etc.) can contribute to a reduction in administrative costs, an
increase in staff productivity, and improvement in the reliability of accounts. While
using new technology can be strongly beneficial for MFIs, it is equally true that it
introduces additional costs, which can handicap their performance. Furthermore,
using technology requires some capabilities. Thus it is the MFIs’ responsibility to
identify the best practices as well as cost-effective ways to use new technology to
improve outreach, efficiency, and client satisfaction, which are becoming
requirements of viability and sustainability in an increasing competitive micro-
finance sector.
- Ceilings on interest rates should be removed: The legal and regulatory framework
should be more flexible. Ceilings on interest rates should be removed and MFIs
should be allowed to charge competitive interest rates.
- Subsidies should be degressive: For recent experiences or the creation of new
branches, it is not abnormal for operating costs to be subsidized. This being said,
viability objective necessarily implies that these subsidies must be decreasing and
cover only a percentage of administrative costs (for example, 80 per cent the first
year and 60 per cent the second year and so on and so forth). In effect, it is important
that subsidies benefit to MFIs which make gradual efforts to attain financial and
operational self-sufficiency.16
- Finally, experience indicates that, apart from the level of outreach and the degree of
self-sustainability, the performance of MFIs depends, among others, on the
managerial efficiency, the social and economic environment, the linkages between
MFIs and the other various development actors, and the impact of MFIs on the
livelihood for the poor. It is important to consider these issues that need further
research.
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